In this paper, we consider the Shapley network design game on undirected networks. In this game, we have an edge weighted undirected network G(V, E) and n selfish players where player i wants to choose a path from source vertex s i to destination vertex t i . The cost of each edge is equally split among players who pass it. The price of stability is defined as the ratio of the cost of the best Nash equilibrium to that of the optimal solution. We present an O(log n/ log log n) upper bound on price of stability for the single sink case, i.e, t i = t for all i.
Introduction
We consider the Shapley network design game, which is also called network design games with fair cost allocation, introduced in [2] . In this game, we are given a network and n selfish players. where player i wants to go from source vertex s i to destination vertex t i . The cost of each edge is shared in a fair manner among players who pass it. We are interested in stable status of the network where no player has the incentive to deviate from its current strategy, which can be modeled by Nash equilibria. The price of stability, defined as the ratio of the cost of the best Nash equilibrium and that of an optimal solution, is used to measure the inefficiency of Nash equilibria. We imagine a network where the traffic will be initially designed by a central network coordinator. However, the coordinator is unable prevent the network users from selfishly deviating from the designated paths. Therefore, in this scenario, the best Nash equilibrium is an obvious solution to propose. In this sense, we can think the price of stability as the degree of degradation of the solution quality for the outcome being stable.
The price of stability was first studied in Schulzan and Moses [1] and was so-called in Anshelevich et al. [2] where the Shapley network design game was also first explored. They showed that a purestrategy Nash equilibrium always exists and the price of stability of this game is at most the nth harmonic number H(n) and also provide an example showing that this upper bound is the best possible in directed networks. For undirected networks, Anshelevich et al. [2] presented a tight bound on price of stability of 4/3 for single source and two players case. However, whether there is a tighter bound for arbitrarily many players in undirect networks was left as an open question. Fiat et al. [3] improved the upper bound to O(log log n) for a special case where each node of the network has a player and they are required to connect to a common destination. Chen and Roughgarden [4] considered the weighted version of the game where each player has a weight and the cost of an edge is shared among the players who pass it in proportion to their weights. As opposed to the ordinary Nash equilibrium considered before, Albers [5] investigated the situation where coordination among players is allowed and showed nearly matching upper and lower bounds on the price of stability with respect to the notion of strong Nash equilibrium. Our results : We prove that for undirected graphs with a distinguished destination to which all players must connect, the price of stability of the Shapley network design game is O( log n log log n ) where n is the number of players.
Preliminaries
We first introduce notations and formally state the problem. We are given a undirected network G(V, E) and n selfish players. Player i has to choose a path from source vertex s i to destination vertex t i . Let P i denote the set of simple s i − t i paths. The cost of an edge e, c(e), is shared equally by all players who pass e. An outcome of the game is specified by a set of n path, each chosen by one player. For an outcome (P 1 , P 2 , . . . , P n ) for P i ∈ P i ,the cost assigned to player i is c i (P 1 , P 2 , . . . , P n ) = e∈P i ce fe where f e is the number of paths that include e. We define the cost of the outcome as
Let P −i denote the vector of paths chosen by the players other than i An outcome (P 1 , P 2 , . . . , P n ) is a Nash equilibrium if for every player i , c i (
The price of stability is defined as the ratio of the cost of the best Nash equilibrium of the game to that of an optimal solution. We note that the optimal solution is the min-cost steiner forest satisfying all connectivity requirement (s i , t i )s.
We consider the following potential function, also used in [2] , that maps every outcome into a numeric value.
where f e denotes the number of paths P i that include edge e and H(n) = 1 +
n is the n'th Harmonic number.
The most important property of the potential function is that if a single player i changes its strategy then the difference between the potential of the new state and that of the original state is exactly the change in the cost of player i [2] .
In a finite game, better-response dynamics is the following process: If the current outcome is not a Nash equilibrium, there exists a player who can decrease its cost by switching its strategy. The player updates its strategy to an arbitrary superior one, and repeat until a Nash equilibrium is reached. While better response dynamics needs not terminate in general, it must terminate in finite steps in Shapley network design games since the potential Φ strictly decreases during the process and no outcome appears twice in a finite game.
An O(
log n log log n ) Upper Bound for the Single Sink Case
We assume the network is connected and all players share the same destination t. It is easy to see an optimal solution is a steiner tree with terminals {s i } i=1,...,n ∪ {t}. Suppose the outcome N ASH = (P N 1 , . . . , P N n ) is a Nash equilibrium which is obtained by better-response dynamics from an optimal solution OP T = (P O 1 , . . . , P O n ). We can assume without loss of generality that N ASH is also a tree. The property of the the potential function ensures that Φ(N ASH) ≤ Φ(OP T ). We denote paths of N ASH and that of OP T by {P N i } i=1,...,n and {P O i } i={1,...,n} , respectively. We also denote the trees of N ash by T N = ∪ i P N i and that of OP T by T O = ∪ i P O i . Let |N ASH| and |OP T | be their costs respectively.
Let f N e denote the number of paths that include edge e in N ASH. Let f N (i) = e:f N e =i c e and g N (j) = e:f N e ≥j c e = i≥j f N (i). It is easy to see |N ASH| = i f N (i) = g N (1). For ease of discussion, we create a dummy player 0 residing in s 0 = t. We can see this player has no influence on either N ASH or OP T . First we consider the tree T O = ∪ i P O i . Doubling all edges in T O forms a Eulerian tour. Traversing this tour gives a sequence S of vertices in T O . Suppose φ is a permutation of {s i } i=0,...,n according to their first appearance in S. It is easy to see
is the length of the shortest path between u and v.
For any two players i and j, let LCA(i, j) be the least common ancestor of s i and s j in tree T N (take t as the root). We let P j i be the subpath of P N i starting from s i and ending at LCA(i, j). From the definition of Nash equilibrium, we know the cost of player i in N ASH is less than that of first reaching s j and then following the path P N j to t. Thus, we have the following. 
We denote the left hand side of last equality by A(i, j). We have
Actually, we only need to prove every e ∈ T N appears in some P
for 0 ≤ i ≤ n. It is easy to see P j i ∪ P j i is the unique path from s i to s j in T N . For any e ∈ T N , let T 1 N,e and T 2 N,e be two trees obtained by deleting e from T N . It is easy to see T i N,e ∩ {s 0 , . . . , s n } = ∅ for i = 1, 2 since each leaf of T N contains at least one player. So, there exists some i such that φ(i) ∈ T 1 e and φ(i+1 mod n+1) ∈ T 2 e and e must lie in the unique path from S φ(i) to S φ(i+1 mod n+1) . We let n 1/2 = max{i|g N (i) ≥ 1 2 · |N ASH|}. We can see the following.
= H(n 1/2 )g N (n 1/2 ) ≥ 1 2 H(n 1/2 )|N ASH|.
Since Φ(N ASH) ≤ Φ(OP T ) ≤ H(n)|OP T |, we have
From (2), we can get
f N (i) ≥ 
Combining inequalities (3) and (4), we have |N ASH| ≤ min{
2H(n)
H(n 1/2 ) , 4n 1/2 (n 1/2 + 1)} · |OP T | for any n 1/2 . The right hand side takes maximum value O( log n log log n ) · |OP T | by choosing n 1/2 = O( log n log log n ). Therefore, we have proved
log n log log n ).
